Abstract
Euthanasia is a highly controversial form of medical
intervention, for here physicians use their skill not to resuscitate the ailing
but to pre-pone their death. The topic remains contentious, for medical issues
have here got entangled with ethico-sociological questions like the distinction
between homicide and mercy-killing, sanctity of life and death, the validity of
surrogate decision about one’s life and the like. Suffering, albeit justified
in the scriptures as conditioning of the soul for life divine, is a challenge
to medical scientists. While ‘kill if you fail to heal’ cannot be the choice of
a doctor whose first duty is non-maleficence, beneficence also demands that a
physician should not be indifferent to the suffering of a patient. We seek
medical intervention to alleviate suffering but, paradoxically enough, prefer
medical inaction when it is a question of terminating suffering or vegetative
state of existence through administration of euthanasia. Since both life and
death should have grace and dignity, it would be irrational to neglect this
option when curative and palliative treatments have failed to rein in agony. If
prescribing euthanasia involves violation of any ethical code, ethical
transgression is to be preferred here, since ethics is to be judged in the
light of reason. With ample scriptural, literary and medical references the
article attempts to evaluate euthanasia from multiple perspectives as also to
justify it on non-economic, non-eugenic grounds.
In Quest of Quietus
In his poem ‘The
Ship of Death” D. H. Lawrence is skeptical about the power of death in making
quietus:
And can a man his own quietus make
with a bare bodkin?
With daggers, bodkins, bullets, man can make
a bruise or break of exit for his life;
but is that a quietus, O tell me, is it quietus?
Surely not so! For how could murder, even self-murder
ever a quietus make? (ll. 17-23)
The quietus that Lawrence has in mind is metaphysical, and
hence has little relevance to the issue of euthanasia (eu , well + thanatos, death) in which death is prescribed to medically terminate long stretched physical suffering. It is a highly controversial
form of medical intervention, for here physicians use their skill not to
resuscitate the ailing but to pre-pone their death. Recently the choice of death when a disease proves
intractable or irreversible has been de-criminalized in some countries, thanks
to the untiring efforts of Dr Jack Kevorkian, nicknamed Dr. Death, and the
right-to- die movements of Hemlock Society (1980), an American activist group
inspired by Dr Kovarkian’s mantra that "Dying is not a crime"1.
Yet the topic remains contentious, for medical issues have here got entangled
with ethico-sociological questions like the distinction between homicide and
mercy-killing, sanctity of life and death, the validity of surrogate decision
about one’s life and the like. The present article is an attempt to explore the
multi-dimensionality of the controversy so that one may judge the matter from a
more rational perspective.
Broadly speaking there are two categories of euthanasia: Voluntary
when a terminally ill patient like
Roosevelt Dawson2 opts
for euthanasia; and non-voluntary (also called mercy killing), when surrogate decision precedes
euthanasia because a patient like Aruna Shanbaug3 who is in PVS4
cannot give consent. There are two more classifications depending on the method
selected for termination of life. Euthanasia
is designated as active if a doctor
quickens a patient’s death by administering life-killing gas or drug. It
is passive when it is a
death by omission, that is, when the patient dies due to planned medical non-interference,
be it withholding or withdrawing of supply of food and drink, or non-application
of life-support devices like ventilator, dialysis and oxygen mask.
Thomas More’s Utopia
(1516) may be looked upon as a blueprint of an ordered society as envisioned by
a civilized thinker. With the progress of civilization, many of its ideas have
become dated. For example, we do not consider it civilized to employ
war-captives as slaves as proposed in Utopia.
However, of More’s insightful ideas euthanasia merits serious attention. The
main points raised by More are that sick people in Utopia receive due care and attention. But when anybody is down with lingering pain and there is
no hope, either of recovery or ease, (s)he is counseled to choose death to get
rid of that ‘pestilent and painful disease’. No man is forced to end his life ‘against his will’. This form of death is ‘without pain’
as it is induced by starvation or overdose of opium. This form of death is to be approved, for taking
away one’s own life without the approbation of ‘the priests and the
council’ is suicide which is considered an
offence in Utopia. So More recommends voluntary euthanasia in
extreme cases of unappeasable agony when all other care has failed, but rightly
insists on approval of competent authority to distinguish it from suicide.
Euthanasia is a civilized way of bidding goodbye to life
where suffering makes life a veritable hell. Literature has examples galore of
such excruciating agony which makes life literally insufferable. One may refer
to the suffering of Emma in Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary. In vain hope of expiring gracefully, Emma consumes arsenic
and writhes in indescribable pain before her final exit from life:
Gradually, her moaning grew louder; a hollow shriek burst from
her; she pretended she was better and that she would get up presently. But she
was seized with convulsions and cried out—
"Ah! my God! It is horrible!"
… She soon began vomiting blood. Her lips became drawn. Her
limbs were convulsed, her whole body covered with brown spots, and her pulse
slipped beneath the fingers like a stretched thread, like a harp-string nearly
breaking.
… Her chest soon began panting rapidly; the whole of her
tongue protruded from her mouth; her eyes, as they rolled, grew paler, like the
two globes of a lamp that is going out so that one might have thought her
already dead but for the fearful labouring of her ribs, shaken by violent
breathing, as if the soul were struggling to free itself (Flaubert 270-78).
Death is indeed a relief worth opting for if life is not only sans
sweetness but full of torments without any promise of respite or remission.
Euthanasia is thus related to the question of human endeavour to tackle a
situation of irremediable suffering.
Medically considered, we suffer when we feel
"pain" which may be described as a pinchingly unpleasant sensation.
The source of this sensation may be physical when "the body is
hurting" or psychological when
the mind is tormented by reflection on a sorry experience in the past (working
of memory) or configuration of something fearful (working of imagination). So
experience of suffering is the result of exposure to what is physically or psychologically
unwholesome. As memory relates us to the past and imagination to the
future, the suffering involved therein is virtual. As such it is outside the
purview of euthanasia which is concerned with control of actual, physical
distress or with ending a vegetative state of existence.
The traditional Indian attitude to suffering is that it is
a form of penance for wrong-doing in past life (karmafal). This attitude to suffering exhorts us to accept
suffering with composure without looking for any redressal. What is more
perplexing is that in many religions suffering is not deemed as cruel but rather
justified as necessary. Christianity urges upon us not only to accept it
ungrudgingly but to rejoice in it (1 Peter 4.13). The principal Biblical arguments in this regard are
(1) that suffering is a passing experience which prepares us for Life Eternal (Romans 8.18); (2)
that it is a providential design for the trial of faith (1
Peter 1.7), as in the book of Job; (3) that it is meant for spiritual
tempering (Romans
5.3-4); (4) that in its purest
form suffering, as
exemplified by the Passion of Christ, is redemptive (Paul II Intr.).
Despite such justification, there is ambivalence even in
the scriptures or why should Christ heal a leper or cure the afflicting sores
of Job. Non-metaphysically speaking, suffering is an uneasy condition which
cannot be relished and hence calls for remedy. It is not a righteous punishment
to be glorified but an organic disorder, a mal- or dys-functioning of the bodily system that ought to be restrained. In other words,
instead of projecting it as a divine yoke to be shouldered ungrudgingly, medical
science interprets it as an extreme form of anguish to be alleviated. Progress
in medical science – from the application of anesthesia (1846) to the
introduction of laparoscopic
surgery (1981) – may be interpreted as progressive triumph in pre-empting the pang
of suffering.
But what about unmitigated suffering which exposes the
impotency of miracle or medicine? If medical progress is synonymous with alleviating
bodily affliction, death is the only alternative one is left with where suffering
cannot be reined in. The pet phrase in the dystopic universe of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World is ‘Ending is better
than mending’ (Huxley Chapter III). But is it at all a humanly acceptable
solution? ‘Kill if you fail to heal’ does not always seem to be a rational
prescription, for it apparently goes against the right to life that everyone is
entitled to.
The ethical aspect of euthanasia gets more complicated if
one judges it from the physician’s point of view. It has been rightly
maintained that euthanasia is no
sweet death: ‘Euthanasia is when the doctor kills the patient’ (Wilke Ch 27). The doctor’s dilemma is that he is oath-bound
to save life not to destroy it5. The first lesson in medical
ethics is non-maleficence,
the motto being primum non nocere, meaning ‘first of all do not harm’. If so, taking away
life to relieve suffering cannot be described as virtuous conduct (beneficence).
To justify this act would be Machiavellian, for here the end (giving relief)
may be noble but the means (killing) for achieving the end is not honest. That
is why in any discourse on euthanasia a distinction is to be made between
physician assisted suicide and criminal homicide. Beneficence demands that a
physician should attend the ailing and try to relieve their suffering. But what
comfort is there for a terminally ill patient writhing in unbearable pain? The
next viable alternative is palliative
care. However, according to medical survey, it is ineffectual in about 5% cases6. Admittedly, DNR (Do Not
Resuscitate) is the only rational option left to the doctor attending patients
remaining unresponsive to curative or palliative treatment.
The polemical issue of euthanasia is also to be judged in
the light of dignity of life and dignity of death. First, although the sanctity
of life entails its inviolability, living means living with dignity. Artificial
continuance of life where death is deferred because the patient has been put
upon ventilator is bereft of all graces that make life worth sustaining.
Borrowing the words of Sebastian Horsley one may humorously describe such a
life as ‘the misery left between
abortion and euthanasia’. Secondly, life, biologically considered,
begins with the formation of zygote through fusion of two gametes, not with the
slitting of the umbilical cord after the birth of a child. If so, medical
termination of pregnancy (MTP) would not only be immoral but a criminal act of
homicide, as it actually is in countries like Ireland. But to ban MTP in the
name of preserving the sanctity of life is to put the cab of civilization into
reverse gear. The awful consequence of this orthodox mindset in the 21st
century is illustrated by the case Savita Halappanavar7, a shameful
instance of sacrificing life in the name of saving life (!).
This puritanical attitude to life springs from an
irrational view that death should be deterred by all means no matter whether
the gain by such deterrence is worth boasting. In J. M. Synge’s Riders to the Sea Maurya desperately
tries to save her sons but having lost all of them finally reconciles herself
to death with a rational insight into its inevitability in the scheme of life:
‘No man at all can be living for ever and we must be satisfied’ (Synge 69). If
Maurya accepts death because it is impossible to escape it, Tithonus in
Tennyson’s eponymous poem discovers that immortality can be a curse. Robbed of
his youth, Tithonus is a mismatch for his eternally young wife Aurora. But as
he is condemned to be immortal, the aged, decrepit Tithonus now realizes the
value of death in the scheme of existence:
The woods decay, the woods decay and fall
The vapours weep their burthen to the ground
Man comes and tills the field and lies beneath
And after many a summer dies the swan
Me only cruel immortality
Consumes (Green 116).
So death is not always to be feared; rather its help is to
be solicited if we do not want the woes of a sufferer to be prolonged. But like
life death, natural or induced, should not be bereft of dignity. One of the
reasons why Owen raged against war is that in any battle soldiers ‘die as
cattle’ with no passing-bells but ‘the monstrous anger of the guns’ (Hewett
158). Medical scientists have tried to itemize some of the main principles of dying
with dignity8. Of these the most important are (1) having control
over when & where one dies, (2) having access to therapeutic, medical and
other benefits, (3) not having life prolonged pointlessly against will. The end of Lily Bart in Edith Wharton’s The House of Mirth (1905) illustrates
what might be termed as death with dignity. Having self-administered overdose
of sedative, Lily waits with ‘a sensuous pleasure for the first
effects of the soporific’:
She knew in advance what form they would take—the gradual
cessation of the inner throb, the soft
approach of passiveness, as though an invisible hand made magic
passes over her in the darkness. The very slowness and
hesitancy of the effect increased its fascination: it was delicious
to lean over and look down into the dim abysses of unconsciousness.
Tonight the drug seemed to work more slowly than usual: each passionate
pulse had to be stilled in turn, and it was long before she felt them dropping
into abeyance, like sentinels falling asleep at their posts… Slowly… sleep
began to enfold her. She struggled faintly against it, feeling that she ought
to keep awake on account of the baby; … for a moment she seemed to have lost
her hold of the child. But no—she was mistaken—the tender pressure of its body was
still close to hers: the recovered warmth flowed through her once more, she yielded
to it, sank into it, and slept (Wharton 320-21).
The depiction of Lily’s death, if assisted by a doctor to
relieve her of her unbearable physical torments, would convince us why
euthanasia should be accepted without hesitation – because in it the dignity of
life and the dignity of death both are preserved.
The principal objection to euthanasia is not so much
medical as ethical. Ethics, incidentally, is a normative science that tries to
formulate principles for judging the right-ness or wrongness of human conduct.
Two common characteristics of moral principles are universalizability and unconditionality.
In other words, they are not only inviolable but their applicability is not subject
to spatio-temporal laws. Yet ethical principles have been flouted and
such transgressions have sometimes been vindicated ethically. In the Mahabharata, when, in order to make Drona give
up fighting, Yudhisthira utters
‘Ashwathama hatha iti kunjara’ (Ashwathama,
the elephant, is dead) – ‘the elephant’
whisperingly – he is guilty of telling a lie, for he makes an
expedient use of equivocation. Ethics
takes into consideration intention and here Yudhisthira’s intention is
politically expedient rather than morally impeccable. An opposite example is
found in the conduct of sage Kaushika who refuses to tell a white lie to save
an innocent life. Interestingly, both are to go to hell, Kaushika is condemned
to suffer there, Yudhisthira is just a visitor. The conclusion that may be
drawn from the story of Kaushika is that saving the innocent is more
important than keeping a personal oath of truthfulness. Here transgression of
moral principle would have been more rational if less in accordance with dry
ethical code. Dehydrated of this human touch, ethics becomes a barren and
irrelevant exercise. The ethical
transgression on the part of Yudhisthira is prompted by a nobler aim of
defeating the Kauravas who represent the vicious and the unjust. Yet since it
involves moral stooping, despite his life-long truthfulness, Yudhisthira cannot
avoid visiting the hell. The story of Yudhisthira teaches us that violation of
ethical principles is not desirable even when unavoidable. The moral that can be
abstracted from these two stories is that if virtuous conduct is divorced from true
goodness (i.e. where both end &
means are good), it ceases to be a virtuous conduct. It has been rightly held that ethics is to be judged in
the light of reason, for what is rational
may not always be ethically satisfying. Where the moral is in conflict with the rational, the rational is to be
preferred, or else we will be doomed to have the destiny of sage Kaushika. Euthanasia, if
rationally acceptable, is to be administered despite the fact that it goes
against some codes of medical ethics.
Here it would be unwise to avoid the rational course of action. To rank the moral above the rational is to
repeat the tragedy of Savita Halappanavar whose life could have been saved if
only the particular law had made some provision for exception or if all
concerned had followed the law in spirit rather than to the letters.
Advocates of
euthanasia who defend it on eugenic or economic grounds seem to be
devil’s advocate. As disability is deemed an aberration, eugenics – the science
of good genes – demands that the
defective life in any form is to be removed. But upholding euthanasia on this
ground is a barbarous proposition, for the wicked might interpret it as an
incentive to ethnic cleansing. One
recalls how the Nazis projected the Jews as unter menschen or subhuman
before they launched their programme of extirpating the Jews, a programme which
was euphemistically designated as Die
Endlösung – the Final Solution. Astronomical
expenses of palliative care in hospices have prompted many pragmatists to
support euthanasia. This sounds realistic, for where our means are limited, we
cannot afford to put to practice the noble ideal of caring for every life. If
five critically ill patients are admitted to a three bedded CCU, the doctor is
to go by priority. So ignoring the demands of the ‘lost’ cases, he makes the
life support system available for those who have most chance of survival. The
doctor’s decision may be rational but justifying euthanasia for limitedness of
our resources would reveal the weakness of our argument. Here the rational
solution will be maximizing the means so as to make provisions comprehensive
enough, not dispensing with any single life on calculation of medical expenses
involved in arranging for palliative care.
The debate over euthanasia has laid bare another medical
dilemma which springs from the duality of our expectations. Instead of leaving
everything to nature we welcome medical interference when it is a question of
curing a disease or curbing suffering by medication. But we oppose medical interference
and demand clinical indifference, if it is a question of putting an end to
suffering by having recourse to euthanasia. One should not forget that
advancement in medical technology has infinitely
complicated the issue of life and death. Whereas in the past a terminally ill
person would have taken seven hours to die naturally, today, thanks to medical
miracles, he might take seven years to breathe his last. When days are
numbered, to artificially prolong life is virtually to compromise with the
dignity of life9.
The Parable of the Good Samaritan contains a moral which
might act as a lighthouse for the doctor in this ocean of moral conflict.
Unlike the priest or Levite who did not take care of the wounded man wincing in
agony by the side of the road, the Samaritan ‘bound up his wounds’ out of compassion and
then ‘brought him to an inn, and took care of him’ (Luke 10. 25-37). When he left
the place next morning, he arranged for his recuperative care at his own expenses.
The parable exhorts us not to be
indifferent but to be sensitive to other’s sufferings. What is required is not dry
compassion but compassion as an incentive to action. And if we are genuinely concerned, we should
not sentimentalize the point of death which may be medically pre-scheduled to
relieve agony of a patient at the irreversible stage of a disease. Euthanasia
may be a human gesture to stand a sufferer in good stead or an excuse for
killing with an ulterior motive. In his book The Forgotten Art of Healing and Other Essays Dr. Udwadia rightly
observes that ‘It is the intention that defines the act and not the method used’
(Udwadia 33). The most convincing argument for choice of involuntary euthanasia
for patients who have slipped into irreversible coma or who are in persistent
vegetative state has been articulated by Lord Hoffman in his judgment on the case
of Anthony Bland:
But the very concept of
having a life has no meaning in relation to Anthony Bland. He is alive, but has
no life at all....There is no question of his life being worth living or not
worth living, because the stark reality is that Anthony Bland is not living a
life at all.
The point stressed by Lord Justice Hoffman is that when
the patient is in PVS, the question of medical termination of life should not
be raised at all because the patient, strictly speaking, is ‘not living.’
To sum up, it is the acuteness of unremitting suffering
and indignities associated with the natural process of dying that have
strengthened argument in support of euthanasia. Even when one finds it
justifiable, precaution against its abuse is a must. First of all, voluntary
euthanasia may be allowed if the attending doctor is certain about the futility
of continuing treatment. This exit-state should preferably be determined by
a board rather than by a single medical practitioner in order to minimize
chances of error. As consent must
precede administration of VE, what is to be ensured is that the choice of death
is well-judged, and not a fleeting thought prompted by a gnawing suffering.
Considerable time must elapse between the first choice of euthanasia and its
administration. The case of Seema Sood10 illustrates that if some
time is given to adjust with adversity, many sufferers may find life
sweeter than death. It is also to be ensured
that euthanasia not prompted by emotional
breakdown which time may heal but acute physical affliction unchecked by
curative treatment or palliative care. Moreover, in order to differentiate
euthanasia from suicide it may be allowed to a patient whose days are literally
numbered or who cannot survive at all.
So it is wrong either to rhapsodize over euthanasia or
object to this civilized way of bidding farewell to the world on religious,
moral, economic or medical grounds. All discourses on euthanasia will be
incomplete if the issue is not considered from the standpoint of the sufferer,
since it is the wearer who knows where the shoe pinches. We will surely have no
hesitation in welcoming it if we look upon death as a merciful deliverer rather
than a fearful tormentor. The more science advances, the less will we have any need
for exercising choice for euthanasia. Finally, where there is any conflict
between the ethical and the rational, we should opt for the rational, for what
is rational cannot be unethical unless we are using ethics in a very narrow
sense. But when the rational is in conflict with the humane, we should not
scruple to embrace the humane solution, for what is humanly acceptable has an
intrinsic value whether or not ratified by our wit and reasoning.
References:
1. Although this has never been officially
acknowledged, Faye Girsh, President Hemlock Society of San Diego, in a
posthumous tribute to Dr Kevorkian, wrote: ‘Love him or hate him, Jack
Kevorkian was the face of the right-to-die movement for almost a decade. … He felt
our attempts were too timid. And, reciprocally, movement leaders made an effort
to distance themselves from his "antics." But the rank and file in our
movement loved Jack Kevorkian.’ <http://www.hemlocksocietysandiego.org/tribute.pdf>
2. Roosevelt Dawson, a twenty one-year-old Oakland
University student who had been bed-ridden for thirteen months, opted for PAS
in 1998 and thus is a beneficiary of euthanasia.
3. Aruna Shanbaug, a former nurse at King Edward Memorial
Hospital, suffered serious brain damage consequent upon rape related atrocity. Although
she has been in persistent vegetative state since 1973, she has not been allowed
to die.
4. ‘PVS is a state
in which there is generally extensive damage to the cerebral neocortex. The
brain stem, which is responsible for the vegetative functions such as
respiratory movement and the regulation of heart rate and rhythm, is more or
less intact. Patients therefore breathe spontaneously, have normally functioning
hearts, and require no support other than nursing care (turning, toileting
etc), feeding and the provision of fluids. Feeding and hydration are generally
done through nasogastric tubes, intravenous lines or stomas going directly into
the stomach.’ <http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/all/pvs.html>
5. The relevant Hippocratic oath reads: ‘I will
prescribe regimens for the good of my patients according to my ability and my
judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a
deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his death.’ <http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/H/HippocraticOath.aspx>.
6. ‘Some doctors
estimate that about 5% of patients don't have their pain properly relieved
during the terminal phase of their illness, despite good palliative and hospice
care’. ‘When Palliative Care is Not
Enough’. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/euthanasia/against/against_1.shtml>
7. A promising young Indian dentist, Savita Halappanavar
developed septicemia out of accidental miscarriage, but she was not helped with
an abortion, for MTP is illegal in Ireland where she lived at that time.
Subsequently, due to multiple organ failure Savita died on 28 October 2012.
8. M.
Henwood in The Future of Health and Care
of Older People: The Best is Yet to Come mentions the following twelve
conditions of good death:
·
To know when death is coming, and to understand
what can be expected
·
To be able to retain control of what happens
·
To be afforded dignity and privacy
·
To have control over pain relief and other
symptom control
·
To have choice and control over where death
occurs (at home or elsewhere)
·
To have access to information and expertise of
whatever kind is necessary
·
To have access to any spiritual or emotional
support required
·
To have access to hospice care in any location,
not only in hospital
·
To have control over who is present and who
shares the end
·
To be able to issue advance directives which
ensure wishes are respected
·
To have time to say goodbye, and control over
other aspects of timing
·
To be able to leave when it is time to go, and
not to have life prolonged pointlessly
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1128725/>
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1128725/>
9. ‘Medical advances have altered the physiological
conditions of death in ways that may be alarming; highly invasive treatment may
perpetuate a human existence through a merger of body and machine that some
might reasonably regard as an insult to life rather than its continuation’ (p.
17) <http://hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/docs/WYC000000110001.pdf
>
10. Seema
Sood, a gold-medalist from BITS Pilani crippled by rheumatoid arthritis since
1993, first appealed for mercy-killing, but
finally changed her mind and chose to survive with all her handicaps.
Works Cited:
1. Flaubert, Gustave. Madame Bovary. Trans. Eleanor Marx-Aveling. Retrieved on August 5, 2013. <http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/flaubert/m_bovary.pdf>
2. Girsh, Faye.
‘A Personal Tribute to Jack Kevorkian’.
Hemlocksocietysandiego. N.p. Retrieved March 29, 2013. <http://www.hemlocksocietysandiego.org/tribute.pdf>
3. Green, David (ed.) The Winged Word. Calcutta: Macmillan, 1974.
4. Good News
Bible: Today’s English Version. Bangalore: The Bible Society of India,
1977.
5. Hewett, R. P. (ed.) A Choice of Poets. London; George G. Harrap & Co., 1968
6. Horsley, Sebastian. Dandy in the Underworld: An Unauthorized Autobiography. Retrieved on August 5, 2013 from <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/51505-life-is-just-the-misery-left-between-abortion-and>
7.
Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World. N. p. Retrieved on August 4, 2013. < http://www.huxley.net/bnw/three.html>
8. Lawrence, D. H. ‘The Ship of Death’. Retrieved
on August 9, 2013. < http://www.kalliope.org/en/digt.pl?longdid=lawrence2001061776>
9. More, Sir Thomas. Utopia. Book II. N.p. August
4, 2013. <http://www.bartleby.com/36/3/8.html>
10. Paul
II, John. ‘Apostolic Letter Salvifici
Doloris’. N. p. August 4, 2013. <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_11021984_salvifici-doloris_en.html>
11. Synge,
J. M. Riders to the Sea. Ed. B.
N. Chowdhury & B. Banerjee. New Book Stall, Calcutta 1992.
12. Udwadia,
F. E. The Forgotten Art of Healing and
Other Essays. New Delhi: O.U. P., 2009
13. Wharton,
Edith. The House of Mirth. The
Electronic Classics Series. August 4, 2013. < http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/wharton/house_of_mirth.pdf>
14. Wilke.
J. ‘Abortion Questions and Answers’. August 5, 2013. < http://abortion-not.org/wilke-6.htm>
Dr Sukriti Ghosal,
MA in English, has done Ph. D. on the literary criticism of Oscar Wilde. He
started his teaching career as a Lecturer in English and is now the Principal
at MUC Women’s College, Burdwan. Dr Ghosal has published over a dozen
research papers in journals of repute, prepared study materials for
university courses and edited a commemorative volume on the famous Bengali
poet Jibanananda Das. He has also published many essays and poems and
translated stories in Bengali.
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